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HOW DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY 
HAVE FAILED CRIMINALISTICS EVIDENCE 
AND A FEW THINGS THE JUDICIARY 
COULD DO ABOUT IT 
David H. Kaye* 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of criminalistics concerns identification—associating traces such as 
fingerprints, fibers, glass fragments, paint chips, bullets, and DNA with their 
possible sources.1  As this type of evidence became a staple of litigation, 
concerns over its accuracy surfaced.2  With increasing urgency, observers 
called for greater regulation of crime laboratories3 and better research into 
the validity of the scientific techniques.4  Books and articles with titles such 
 
*  Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Law, University Park.  This Article was 
prepared for the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, held on 
October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law.  The Symposium took place under the 
sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.  For an 
overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  Symposium on Forensic Expert 
Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 (2018).  Timothy Lau and Jay 
Koehler provided helpful comments on a draft. 
 
 1. On the meaning of “criminalistics,” see, for example, KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS:  THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 10–12 
(2001); CHARLES E. O’HARA & JAMES W. OSTERBURG, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINALISTICS, 
at xii (1949) (defining criminalistics as “that science which applies the physical sciences in 
the investigation of crimes”).  
 2. In 1979, for example, Professor Edward Imwinkelried described a government report 
on proficiency testing at some 240 crime laboratories as “alarming.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal 
Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 636 (1979).  Two years later, he deemed this “an 
understatement” and wrote that “‘[s]hocking’ would be more precise.” Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence—A Primer on Evaluating the 
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 268 (1981).  However, the 
percentages in the report were not broken down into false-positive, false-negative, and falsely 
inconclusive findings, and they had other deficiencies.  A more refined analysis suggested that 
the error rates on the early proficiency tests were inflated. Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. 
Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–1991, II:  Resolving 
Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1009 (1995).  Even so, traditional 
proficiency tests are not designed to measure the risk of error in actual casework and probably 
underestimate it in most fields. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate Error 
Rates in the Forensic Sciences, 12 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 89, 90–91 (2013). 
 3. E.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science:  The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. 109, 109 (1991). 
 4. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science:  The Pitfalls of Law 
Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 64–65 (describing the 
history of research in the field). 
1640 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
as Forensic Science Under Siege and Failed Forensics followed.5  With 
evidence of serious errors mounting in both high- and low-profile cases, 
Congress appropriated funds for “the National Academy of Sciences to create 
an independent Forensic Science Committee” to study and make 
recommendations to improve the practice of forensic science.6  A report 
emerged in 2009.7  It confirmed much of the earlier academic criticism.  The 
seventeen-member committee pointedly wrote that “[i]n a number of forensic 
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either 
the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the 
courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem.”8 The 
committee also observed that “[f]ederal appellate courts have not with any 
consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of 
scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases 
involving Daubert questions.”9  This situation, it added, was “not really 
surprising” given that Daubert is so “flexible.”10 
The years that followed proved frustrating to those who had hoped that the 
courts would demand, as a condition for admissibility, the scientific proof of 
validity and accuracy that the committee found absent in some areas.11  Of 
all the published opinions responding to challenges to unique identification 
via largely subjective comparisons of patterns and impressions, a grand total 
of two saw the sentence bemoaning the “utterly ineffective” judicial 
treatment of validity or accuracy as important enough to quote.12  To be sure, 
many courts acknowledged the existence of the committee’s calls for 
research to demonstrate these qualities, but they read them as not particularly 
relevant to the issue of admissibility.  After all, these judges wrote, the 
recommendations for filling even the most gaping holes in foundational 
research were not directed at the courts,13 and, even if the committee had 
 
 5. See generally KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE (2007); Michael J. 
Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics:  How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It 
Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2008). 
 6. S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005). 
 7. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  A PATH FORWARD 1 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ]. 
 8. Id. at 53.  
 9. Id. at 96 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. E.g., David L. Faigman et al., Preface to 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, at x (David 
L. Faigman et al. eds., 2016) (noting that “experience-based specialties have suffered . . . what 
was thought to be a terminal blow in 2009 with the publication of the [NRC] Report” but that 
“courts have largely ignored the virtually consensus opinion of mainstream academic 
scientists” and have responded to it with “indifference” and “intransigence”). 
 12. Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415–16 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 104 n.4 (Minn. 2010). 
 13. E.g., United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[T]he NRC 
Report does not recommend barring fire investigators from offering opinions . . . .”); 
Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798, 820 n.26 (Mass. 2017) (“[T]he [NRC] Report 
does not draw the conclusion that fingerprint evidence lacks such reliability that courts should 
no longer deem it admissible . . . .”).   
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opined on the admissibility of a given type of evidence, that recommendation 
could “not bind federal courts.”14 
In response to the marginalization of the NRC report and other critiques of 
some fields of criminalistics, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology (PCAST)—a group of the nation’s most eminent scientists 
and engineers that makes policy recommendations for the executive 
branch—issued a report late in 2016 on Ensuring Scientific Validity of 
Feature-Comparison Methods.15  The report is far more direct in its approach 
to legal questions than was the 2009 report.  It argues that under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, which applies to expert testimony generally and to scientific 
expert testimony as described in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,16 admissibility requires scientific validity, that validity only can be 
established through empirical studies of how the methods work, and that for 
largely subjective conclusions of criminalists on the possible sources of trace 
evidence, performance studies must show a rate of false-positive 
identifications of no more than 5 percent.17  The report concludes that some 
commonly used methods of identification have not been shown to satisfy 
these criteria.  The ineluctable conclusion is that the courts cannot admit 
findings from these methods.18 
This moment thus provides an opportunity for reflection on the principal 
rules governing the reception of criminalistics evidence in the courts.  Should 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 be rewritten to make it clear that criminalistics 
evidence requires certain kinds of validity studies before it can be considered 
admissible?  Would “an Advisory Committee note, providing guidance to 
Federal judges concerning the admissibility under Rule 702 of expert 
testimony based on forensic feature-comparison methods” suffice?19  Is more 
judicial education on Daubert and the nature and practice of science the 
solution? 
At the risk of disappointing, this Article does not give firm answers to these 
questions.  Its goal is less ambitious.  It supplies information to assist judicial 
bodies concerned with possible rules changes—and courts applying the 
current rules—in improving their regulation of criminalistics identification 
evidence.  Part I documents how courts have failed to faithfully apply 
Daubert’s criteria for scientific validity to this type of evidence.  It describes 
how ambiguities and flaws in the terminology adopted in Daubert combined 
 
 14. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
 15. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:  ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R76Y-
7VU]. 
 16. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 17. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 18. See David H. Kaye, PCAST on “Foundational Validity,” Evidentiary Reliability, and 
the Admissibility of “Firearms Analysis,” FORENSIC SCI. STAT. & L. (Oct. 23, 2016, 2:21 PM), 
http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/10/pcast-on-foundational-validity.html 
[https://perma.cc/PCV5-AQQV]. 
 19. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 145. 
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with the opaqueness of forensic-science publications and standards have been 
exploited to shield some test methods from critical judicial analysis.  Simply 
desisting from these avoidance strategies would be an improvement. 
Part II notes how part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael20 has enabled courts to lower the bar for what is presented 
as scientific evidence by mistakenly maintaining that there is no difference 
between that evidence and other expert testimony that need not be 
scientifically validated.  It suggests that a version of Rule 702 that explicitly 
insists on more rigorous validation of evidence that is promoted or 
understood as being “scientific” would be workable and more clearly 
compatible with the rule’s common law roots. 
Part III sketches various meanings of the terms “reliability” and “validity” 
in science and statistics, on the one hand, and in the rules and opinions on the 
admissibility of expert evidence, on the other.  It discusses the two-part 
definition of “validity” in the PCAST report and the proposed criteria for 
demonstrating scientific validity of subjective pattern-matching testimony.  It 
contends that if “validity” means that a procedure (even a highly subjective 
one) for making measurements and drawing inferences is fit for its intended 
use, then whether test results that have higher error rates than the ones 
selected in the report might nevertheless assist fact finders who are also 
appropriately informed of the evidence’s probative value must be evaluated. 
Finally, Part IV articulates two distinct approaches to informing judges or 
jurors of the import of similarities in features:  the traditional one in which 
examiners opine on the truth and falsity of source hypotheses and a more 
finely grained one in which criminalists report only on the strength of the 
evidence.  It suggests that the rules for admitting scientific evidence need to 
be flexible enough to accommodate the latter, likelihood-based testimony 
when it has a satisfactory empirically established basis. 
I.  DODGING DAUBERT 
Daubert resolved a conflict among the circuit courts as to whether 
“‘general acceptance’ [in the relevant scientific community was] the 
exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony” under Rule 702.21  
The Court held that it was not—that the trial court must employ a broader 
framework for evaluating “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid.”22  Moreover, Justice Harry Blackmun’s 
opinion for the Court supplied a nonexhaustive list of “pertinent 
consideration[s],”23 namely, (1) “whether it can be (and has been) tested,”24 
(2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 
publication,”25 (3) “the known or potential rate of error,”26 (4) “the existence 
 
 20. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 22. Id. at 592–93. 
 23. Id. at 593. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
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and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation,”27 and 
(5) the “degree of acceptance within [a relevant scientific] community.”28  As 
applied in the lower courts, however, this list was not always used to structure 
a thoughtful inquiry into the “overarching subject [of] scientific validity.”29  
Instead, and particularly with criminalistics evidence, they sometimes 
devolved into a superficial, if not pro forma, checklist.  A brief sketch of this 
development with respect to each factor follows.30 
A.  Testability and Testing 
The Supreme Court began its explanation of scientific validity by 
observing that “a key question . . . in determining whether a theory or 
technique is scientific knowledge . . . will be whether it can be (and has been) 
tested.”31  Indeed, the Court added that “generating hypotheses and testing 
them to see if they can be falsified . . . is what distinguishes science from 
other fields of human inquiry.”32 
In applying this first factor, two problems have emerged.  First, some 
courts have been impressed with testability rather than actual testing.  In Lee 
v. Martinez,33 the Supreme Court of New Mexico deemed the “testability” 
prong of Daubert satisfied merely because “the control question polygraph 
examination can be tested.”34  And in United States v. Mitchell,35 Judge 
Edward Becker wrote for the Third Circuit that “the hypotheses that 
undergird the discipline of fingerprint identification are testable, if only to a 
lesser extent actually tested by experience, and so we find this factor to weigh 
in favor of admitting the evidence.”36 
Although theories that cannot be falsified—or at least tested to some 
degree—by experiments or observations are not part of science, the abstract 
possibility of testing adds almost nothing to a claim of scientific knowledge.  
Testability or falsifiability alone does not come close to satisfying the first 
Daubert factor.  The mere possibility of systematically checking on the 
predictions of astrologers, for instance, would not “weigh in favor of 
admitting” such predictions. 
 
 27. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 28. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 29. Id. at 594–95. 
 30. For a more complete treatment, see DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE:  EXPERT EVIDENCE § 7.3.2. (2d ed. 2010). 
 31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 32. Id. (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic 
Substances Litigation:  The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 643, 645 (1992)). 
 33. 96 P.3d 291 (N.M. 2004). 
 34. Id. at 299 (emphasis added). 
 35. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 36. Id. at 238; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 275 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A 
number of circuits have determined that this ‘sliding-scale’ procedure [for deciding whether 
two fingerprints come from the same finger] is testable . . . .”); United States v. Love, No. 
10cr2418–MMM, 2011 WL 2173644, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011) (“The fact that latent 
fingerprint analysis can be tested for reliability, without more, allows the first Daubert ‘factor 
to weigh in support of admissibility.’” (quoting Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 238)). 
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Second, courts have been quite willing to find the more weighty “has been 
tested” facet fulfilled by nonscientific forms of testing.  One finds statements 
such as “the reliability of the technique has been tested in the adversarial 
system for over a century”37 and “unquestionably the technique has been 
subject to testing, albeit less rigorous than a scientific ideal, in the world of 
criminal investigation, court proceedings, and other practical 
applications . . . .”38  This “adversarial testing”39 may be a good thing, but it 
is no substitute for scientific testing.40  The fortuitous and haphazard 
discovery of error in the justice system surely is not “what the Supreme Court 
meant when it discussed testing as an admissibility factor.”41 
B.  Peer Review and Publication 
The second Daubert factor is “whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication.”42  Again, two judicial practices 
often have drained the substance from this consideration.  First, although the 
best reading of Daubert is that this factor refers only to publication in a 
rigorously refereed scientific journal,43 a surprising number of courts have 
used “peer review” to mean a second opinion in a given case—such as the 
routine review by a laboratory supervisor or a second analyst.44  This kind of 
“peer review” does not address the validity of a scientific theory or method.  
It merely shows that two individuals applying the same methodology can 
reach the same conclusion.  It enhances confidence that the criminalist has 
 
 37. John, 597 F.3d at 275. 
 38. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ingerprint analysis has been tested and proven 
to be a reliable science over decades of use for judicial purposes.” (quoting United States v. 
Joseph, No. CR. A. 99-238, 2001 WL 515213, at *1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001))).  For discussion 
of why “longstanding use establishes something, [but] it establishes less than its advocates 
suggest,” see Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 748 (2011). 
 39. United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000)). 
 40. Practical applications are relevant to general acceptance, but what could be more 
practical than the treatment of life and death diseases—a practice that is littered with the bodies 
of therapies shown by controlled experiments to have been worthless or unnecessary? See 
KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 8.7.2.  On the absence of valid expertise in a variety of practical 
domains in which expert advice is commonly sought, see generally DAVID H. FREEDMAN, 
WRONG:  WHY EXPERTS* KEEP FAILING US—AND HOW TO KNOW WHEN NOT TO TRUST THEM 
(2010). 
 41. United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (quoting United 
States v. Llera Plaza, No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002)).  In an 
opinion vacating the one quoted above, Judge Louis Pollak remained unimpressed with the 
government’s arguments about “adversarial testing.”  In that opinion, he again expressed his 
disagreement “with [the] contention[] that . . . a century of litigation has been a form of 
‘adversarial’ testing that meets Daubert’s criteria” and “concluded . . . that Daubert’s testing 
factor was not met . . . .” United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (E.D. Pa. 
2002). 
 42. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 43. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.3.2(b)(2). 
 44. For opinions of the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits substituting this quality-
control measure for the “peer review” preferred in Daubert, see id. § 7.3.2(b)(4); id. § 7.6.3(b) 
(2d ed. Supp. 2016). 
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performed the assigned task carefully, but the review of a forensic test by a 
second examiner does not satisfy the concern with the validity of a theory or 
method that motivated the phrase “peer review” in Daubert.45  The point of 
the discussion of peer review in every opinion in Daubert, starting with the 
district court and culminating in the Supreme Court, was to ensure that 
scientific theories and methods are scrutinized in the scientific community 
before they are used in the courtroom.  The number of forensic examiners 
participating in a particular procedure is irrelevant to this concern. 
Second, there is a tendency to count publications of all stripes as indicia of 
scientific knowledge.  Publications in the Journal of Clinical Ecology with 
an editorial board of believers in this fringe theory would or should be given 
little credence in a toxic tort case.46  The same result should occur for 
forensic-science publications that are not readily accessible to research 
scientists and whose editors and referees lack broad expertise in statistics and 
empirical research methods.  Otherwise, the publications become comparable 
to talk within congregations of true believers and bear little resemblance to 
the desired scientific practice of critical review and debate mentioned in 
Daubert.47  Yet, assurances that methods have been discussed in practitioner 
journals have been accepted without further inquiry.48 
C.  Controlling Standards 
The Daubert list of factors also includes “the existence and maintenance 
of standards controlling the technique’s operation.”49  Here too, courts have 
been overinclusive in applying the indicator of validity.  Daubert referred 
only to standards for making measurements or drawing inferences.  It cited 
to United States v. Williams50 as “noting [a] professional organization’s 
standard governing spectrographic analysis.”51  In Williams, the Second 
Circuit referred to a rule that ten matching features must be found in voice 
spectra “before a positive identification can be made.”52  Rules like these, 
which control analyst discretion, enhance reliability within and across 
examiners.  Such repeatability and reproducibility, as these two types of 
 
 45. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009); Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 
at 703; Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305, at *10, vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 46. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F. 2d 1188, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1988); Bert 
Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 689 (1988). 
 47. Thus, one of the first documents approved by the National Commission on Forensic 
Science was an expression of views on what can be deemed part of the requirements of 
“scientific literature.” Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., Scientific Literature in Support of 
Forensic Science and Practice, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/02/25/scientific_literature_views_document_as_ad
opted_1_30_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJQ7-WJ8M]. 
 48. E.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (relying on 
articles in the AFTE Journal).  For discussion of the nature of the journal, see KAYE ET AL., 
supra note 30, § 7.6.3(b) (2d ed. Supp. 2016); Mnookin et al., supra note 38, at 754–58. 
 49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 50. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 51. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 52. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. 
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reliability are sometimes called,53 affect the validity of a procedure by 
making the outcomes less erratic.54 
Many of the identification methods in common use are devoid of such 
controlling standards.  Instead, published standards contain circular or 
vacuous statements about the extent to which two samples must display 
similarities for a criminalist to conclude that they are (or simply could be) 
from the same source.  An example is the Standard Guide for Forensic Paint 
Analysis and Comparison that “describes methods to develop discriminatory 
information.”55  To discriminate is “to distinguish between two samples 
based on significant differences.”56  A “significant difference” is “a 
difference between two samples that indicates that the two samples do not 
have a common origin.”57  Round and round we go.  A controlling standard 
would prescribe when a difference is “significant” and how “significant” it is 
in including or excluding possible sources. 
Some courts seem to recognize that some “standards” do nothing to 
confine discretion,58 but others are impressed with such unedifying directives 
as “7.12.5 Evaluate the similarities, differences, and limitations.  Determine 
their significance individually and in combination” and “7.13 Form a 
conclusion based on results of the above analyses, comparisons, and 
evaluations.”59  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit perceived controlling standards in 
the fact that examiners look at the same features (to make highly 
discretionary judgments) and undergo proficiency tests of these judgments.60 
Such practices are desirable, but they do not constitute “controlling 
standards” for the evaluation of similarities and differences within the 
 
 53. E.g., JOINT COMM. FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY, INTERNATIONAL VOCABULARY OF 
METROLOGY—BASIC AND GENERAL CONCEPTS AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 38–42, 98, 104–05 
(3d ed. 2008), https://www.bipm.org/utils/common/documents/jcgm/JCGM_200_2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S57W-DQJR]. 
 54. Of course, the standardized outcomes could all be wrong, in which case the procedure 
would be invalid.  Consistency is not validity, but it is a necessary precondition for validity.  
For a report questioning the validity of using voice spectrograms to identify speakers, see 
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 49 (1979). 
 55. AM. SOC’Y FOR TESTING & MATERIALS, STANDARD E1610-17:  STANDARD GUIDE FOR 
FORENSIC PAINT ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON § 1.2 (2017). 
 56. Id. § 3.2.4. 
 57. Id. § 3.2.10. 
 58. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Johnsted, 30 F. Supp. 3d 814, 819 (W.D. Wisc. 2013); cf. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 
979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[S]earching this record for evidence of standards that guide and 
limit the analyst in exercise of these subjective judgments, we find very little.”). 
 59. See AM. SOC’Y FOR TESTING & MATERIALS, STANDARD E2290-07A:  STANDARD GUIDE 
FOR EXAMINATION OF HANDWRITTEN ITEMS (2007); see also Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 
213, 224–25 (D.C. 2012) (relying on the fact that “FBI document examiners . . . are trained 
according to and employ national standards recommended by ASTM International . . . and at 
each step look for multiple handwriting characteristics that conform to standards recognized 
by ASTM International and published in recognized questioned document texts.”).  ASTM 
withdrew Standard E2290-07a in 2016. See ASTM E2290-07a, ASTM INT’L, 
https://www.astm.org/Standards/E2290.htm [https://perma.cc/6TFG-LUCB] (last visited Feb. 
14, 2018). 
 60. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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meaning of Daubert.  Nevertheless, it is tempting for courts to refer to the 
mere existence of documents from standards-development organizations on 
different matters and quality-assurance measures as a basis for finding that 
the “controlling standards” factor argues for admissibility. 
D.  Error Rates 
Along with “standards controlling the technique’s operation,”61 the 
Daubert Court spoke of “the known or potential rate of error,”62 again using 
spectrographic voice identification as an example.  Lower courts had relied 
on experiments with voice exemplars (with little to no analysis of the 
comprehensiveness and design of the experiments) in ruling on the 
admissibility of the technique.63  A scientifically rigorous way to validate 
claims of accuracy (under experimental conditions) is to compare analysts’ 
judgments of the origin of pairs of exemplars as coming from the same 
speaker, or instead from different speakers, when the experimenters (but not 
the analysts) know the true state of affairs. 
Many post-Daubert opinions do not adhere to this type of validity study in 
discussing error rates for identification tests.  Some courts accepted the 
meaningless claim of “a potential error rate of zero for the method [because] 
any error is attributable to examiners.”64  Some opined that “the known error 
rate remains impressively low”65 because the examiners do not know of 
many mistakes that they have made in their casework66 and they make no 
mistakes on training or later proficiency tests—even though these tests “are 
not shown to be accurate facsimiles of the tasks undertaken by fingerprint 
analysts in actual cases.”67  This kind of information is encouraging, but it is 
far removed from the error-rate statistics cited to in Daubert. 
 
 61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citing United States 
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 62. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
 63. The Smith court referred to experiments finding false-positive rates of 2.4 percent and 
0.31 percent, false-negative rates of 6 percent and .53 percent, and “no errors whatsoever.” 
Smith, 869 F.2d at 354.  The court also noted two studies with far higher rates of 62.7 percent 
and 83.33 percent (presumably for false positives). Id.  Unsurprisingly, the experiments found 
better performance on “closed” sets of exemplars (those in which the analyst knew that the 
questioned sample came from a small number of possible speakers) than in “open” sets. 
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, supra note 54, at 24. 
 64. United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006).  The claim is meaningless 
because there is no inherent rate of error for the “method” that can be separated from the 
performance of the human analyst.  Because it is a claim that cannot be falsified by any 
conceivable study, it is outside the realm of science. 
 65. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 66. The court of appeals reached this conclusion on the basis of an FBI supervisor’s 
testimony that he knew of only one error per eleven million cases, although it allowed that this 
estimate might be on the low side. Id. at 990–91. 
 67. Id. at 990. 
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E.  Degree of Acceptance 
The final factor articulated in Daubert is general acceptance.  Under the 
previously leading case of Frye v. United States,68 this consideration was 
determinative.  Under Daubert, “explicit identification of a relevant scientific 
community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance 
within that community”69 remain important.  Theories and methods that are 
generally accepted in the scientific community are more likely to be valid 
than those that are not. 
Clearly, if one limits the “scientific community” to individuals who 
produce the challenged evidence or write textbooks and standards on how to 
generate such evidence, the methodology will be generally accepted.  But 
“forensic science service provider[s]” or “forensic science practitioner[s]”70 
are not coterminous with a scientific community.  The National Commission 
on Forensic Science regarded “forensic science” as encompassing either 
“scientific or technical practices.”71  In its view, an “individual 
who . . . applies scientific or technical practices to the recognition, collection, 
analysis, or interpretation of evidence” can be a forensic-science 
practitioner.72  Traditionally, this scientific and technical community has 
been affected by, but not imbued with, the kind of research culture associated 
with other fields of science.73  As the theories and claims of criminalists have 
come under scrutiny from a wider range of research scientists, it has become 
harder for courts to discern general agreement on these matters.  The recent 
PCAST report is an extreme example of discordant voices in the scientific 
community. 
In the face of disagreements about the scientific status of some methods, a 
number of courts have substituted general acceptance within “the expert 
community,”74 “the forensic identification community,”75 the “Daubert 
community,”76 and “the courts”77 for acceptance in the scientific community.  
The Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that “fingerprint identification is 
generally accepted within the forensic identification community”78 was 
enough to place a checkmark for Daubert’s general acceptance factor on the 
government’s scorecard.79  Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court categorically asserted that “[a] technical community, or a community 
 
 68. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1992). 
 70. These are terms that the National Commission on Forensic Science introduced. See 
Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., Views of the Commission Defining Forensic Science and 
Related Terms, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 (May 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ 
ncfs/file/786571/download [https://perma.cc/4VVG-9E7F]. 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally Mnookin et al., supra note 38. 
 74. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 75. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 76. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 25 (Mass. 2005). 
 77. Crisp, 324 F.3d at 268. 
 78. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241. 
 79. Id. 
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of experts who have some other specialized knowledge, can qualify as a 
relevant Daubert community in the same way a scientific community can.”80 
The problem with such statements is that not every “Daubert community” 
is fungible.81  General acceptance of relativity theory among physicists is one 
thing; acceptance among arson investigators of “crazed glass” as an indicator 
of accelerants is another.82  Because the standards of acceptance within the 
expert community are crucial to gauging the significance of general 
acceptance, courts that apply the general-acceptance factor mechanically are 
missing the meaning of Daubert.83 
II.  ADMITTING CRIMINALISTICS EVIDENCE 
FOR WHAT IT IS:  OF BABIES AND BATHWATER 
I have tried to lay bare how courts have deviated from Daubert by altering 
or misapplying the five factors it provided as a framework for judging 
scientific validity.  Repeatedly, they have shied away from scrutinizing 
criminalistics evidence of identity as Daubert originally seemed to require.  
Beneath this doctrinal dissection lies the question of causation.  Why have 
courts applied a weakened or mutated form of Daubert to this type of 
evidence?  This is essentially a question of psychology, sociology, and 
political science.  Commentators have pointed to such psychological and 
institutional factors as disparities in resources between prosecutors and 
defendants, deficiencies of defense counsel, a lack of knowledge or scientific 
competence, strong prior beliefs about validity, proprosecution attitudes, 
conservatism, and a conviction that evidence is useful even if the claims of 
“scientific knowledge” under Rule 702 are not fully validated.84 
Understandably, a constant refrain in the opinions rejecting Daubert 
challenges to criminalistics is that even if the evidence is too imperfectly 
validated to wear the mantle of science, it is still valuable, and “wholesale 
exclusion” would be too “drastic,”85 would impose “an extremely high 
degree of intellectual purity,”86 and would “make the best the enemy of the 
good.”87  The doctrinal route to admitting expert evidence that does not quite 
 
 80. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 25. 
 81. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 6.3.3(b). 
 82. See JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION 472 (2d ed. 
2013) (discussing such “old firemen’s tales” and the lack of “natural scientific skepticism” 
among arson investigators). 
 83. They also are distorting Kumho Tire, which allows trial courts to apply some or all of 
the Daubert factors to nonscientific expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 141 (1999).  Kumho Tire does not mean that general acceptance is equally supportive 
of admitting the evidence regardless of the nature of the community that accepts it. 
 84. See Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1556 (2017); Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension Between the 
Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME 329, 339 (2008); Joseph Sanders, 
“Utterly Ineffective”:  Do Courts Have a Role in Improving the Quality of Forensic Expert 
Testimony?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 558–59 (2010). 
 85. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 86. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 87. United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
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meet the requirements expected of scientific evidence is to call it 
nonscientific.  With that label, the evidence need not constitute the “scientific 
knowledge” sought in Daubert.  Instead, “the court may admit the testimony 
as non-scientific expert testimony under Rule 702 and Kumho Tire.”88  Thus, 
District Judge Louis Pollak, who famously ruled that latent print examiners 
could not make source attributions89—and then reversed his ruling90—
ultimately concluded that examiners were not engaged in “a science”91 but 
were “like accountants, vocational experts, accident-reconstruction experts, 
appraisers of land or of art, [or] experts in tire failure analysis.”92  Similarly, 
state courts have short-circuited the special scrutiny normally given to 
scientific evidence by characterizing some pattern comparisons as 
nonscientific or within the jury’s grasp.93 
If criminalistics evidence is to pass muster on these grounds, the theory 
must be followed to its logical conclusion.  The trial court must ensure that 
experts do not “wrap themselves in a scientist cloak.”94  This will be quite 
difficult if the witnesses are called forensic scientists, if they have employed 
esoteric scientific devices in their analyses, or if the court has designated 
them as experts in front of the jury.95  They (or the court) would have to call 
attention to the parts of their testimony that cannot be said to rest on adequate 
validity studies, cautioning jurors that those parts do not constitute scientific 
knowledge. 
 
 88. Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 577 (2d Cir. 2017).  Kumho Tire involved an 
engineer’s poorly validated testimony about the cause of a fatal tire failure based on a visual 
inspection. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 145–47.  There, the Supreme Court explained that the 
overarching requirement of extra “reliability” read into Rule 702 in Daubert (and later codified 
in an amendment to the Rule) applies to all expert testimony, and it held that trial courts may 
rely on whatever Daubert factors would be helpful in gauging the “reliability” of that 
testimony. See id. at 148–49. 
 89. See United States v. Llera Plaza, No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 90. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
 91. Id. at 560. 
 92. Id. at 563.  Judge Posner’s opinion in United States v. Herrera is similar in deeming 
latent print examinations to be admissible as nonscientific “expert evidence . . . on the style of 
a particular artist would be [admissible as] the expert’s opinion, based on comparison with 
other paintings, of the genuineness of the painting alleged to be a forgery.” United States v. 
Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 93. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 8.6 (questioning this reasoning as applied to 
examinations of bite marks, hair, handwriting, and toolmarks); id. § 8.9.4 (2d ed. Supp. 2016) 
(questioning this reasoning as applied to adhesive tape tears). 
 94. Sanders, supra note 84, at 557.  An example of such cloaking is the Scientific Working 
Group for Firearms and Toolmarks’s (SWGGUN) reliance on “Richard Feynman’s writings 
on the character of physical laws for guidance in articulating the critical scientific method 
elements used in the discovery, origination, and evolution of firearm and toolmark 
identification.” See SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR FIREARMS & TOOLMARKS, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIREARM AND TOOLMARK IDENTIFICATION 1 (2013) (footnote omitted), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/11/28/swggun_foundational_report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R9BZ-FVH4]. 
 95. The last practice is inadvisable. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., Views of the 
Commission:  Judicial Vouching, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
archives/ncfs/file/880246/download [https://perma.cc/X8KS-YTAF]. 
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It is worth noting that the concern here is not connected to any abstract 
philosophical analysis of the distinction between science and other forms of 
knowledge.  Even if there is no epistemologically distinctive “scientific 
method,”96 invoking a “scientific” basis for a conclusion has special 
rhetorical and persuasive power.97  Consequently, “it is the Court’s role to 
ensure that a given discipline does not falsely lay claim to the mantle of 
science, cloaking itself with the aura of unassailability that the imprimatur of 
‘science’ confers and thereby distorting the truth-finding process.”98  
Attending to this concern enables courts to accomplish what the Supreme 
Court in Kumho Tire cursorily dismissed as impractical and unnecessary—
namely, distinguishing “between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or 
‘other specialized’ knowledge.”99 
For much of the last century, courts distinguished between scientific and 
other forms of expert testimony, demanding more of the former than the 
latter.  Generally, they were successful in demarcating the type of expert 
testimony that needed heightened scrutiny.  A version of Rule 702 that 
explicitly insists on more rigorous validation of evidence that is promoted or 
understood as being “scientific” would be workable and more clearly 
compatible with the rule’s common law roots. 
III.  DEFINING RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
The PCAST report has reinvigorated debate on the extent to which certain 
fields of criminalistics are based on scientific knowledge as opposed to less 
impressive foundations.100  Unlike the 2009 NRC committee, which avoided 
overt legal conclusions, PCAST presents an analysis of the implications of 
its findings for the admissibility of several types of evidence and creates a 
somewhat neoteric vocabulary (compared to conventional usage in statistics) 
to map its criteria for “validity” onto Rule 702. 
Because any revision or advice on Rule 702 should carefully consider 
which terms to use, it may be helpful to note the specialized meanings of the 
 
 96. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON:  BETWEEN 
SCIENTISM AND CYNICISM 94–95 (2003); cf. SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR FIREARMS & TOOLMARKS, 
supra note 95, at 1–2 (noting that “1) observation of a phenomenon, 2) developing a premise, 
forming a hypothesis, 3) develop a testing model, 4) using reliable methodology, and 5) 
forming a theory” constitute the “scientific method elements consistent to those rudiments 
described by Feynman”). 
 97. HAACK, supra note 96, at 18.  According to Haack, 
“Scientific” has become an all-purpose term of epistemic praise meaning “strong, 
reliable, good.”  No wonder, then, that psychologists and sociologists and 
economists are sometimes so zealous in insisting on their right to the title.  No 
wonder, either, that practitioners in other areas—“Management Science,” “Library 
Science,” “Military Science,” even “Mortuary Science”—are so keen to claim it. 
Id. 
 98. Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016); see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 6.2, at 247 n.8 (referring to the many cases 
recognizing this concern). 
 99. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999).  For an extended analysis 
and a proposed solution to this “boundary problem,” see KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, ch. 7. 
 100. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 15.7.5 (2d ed. Supp. 2018).  Parts of this discussion 
are drawn from this work. 
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terms “validity” and “reliability” in science and law.  Confusion can arise 
because in science “reliability” and “validity” are not synonyms, and 
“reliability” in the law of evidence does not mean scientific or statistical 
reliability.101 
A.  Legal Reliability 
For better or worse, the Daubert Court chose to use the word “reliability” 
to mean “trustworthiness.”  Justice Blackmun explained that: 
[S]cientists typically distinguish between “validity” (does the principle 
support what it purports to show?) and “reliability” (does application of the 
principle produce consistent results?). . . .  [O]ur reference here is to 
evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness.  In a case involving 
scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific 
validity.102 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 goes beyond the validity spoken of in 
Daubert for principles or methods and uses the term “reliable” in its legal 
sense to encompass the application of those principles or methods in a 
particular case.  It requires not only that “the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods”—as required in Daubert—but also that “the 
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.”  This amended version of the original Rule codifies the dubious 
conflation of method and conclusion adopted in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner.103 
B.  Scientific Reliability of a Measurement Procedure 
In most scientific fields, “reliability,” as Justice Blackmun acknowledged, 
pertains to consistency.  A rigid ruler is a reliable measuring device (when 
used properly).  It gives the same measurements for the length of a straight 
line when used repeatedly.  An elastic ruler would produce more variable 
measurements of the same line.  In Hall v. Florida,104 the Supreme Court 
used “reliability” in this statistical sense in its discussion of the reliability of 
IQ scores.105  Test developers use clever methods to measure reliability,106 
and no standardized test would be marketed without an estimate of its 
reliability. 
 
 101. See id. § 12.7 (2d ed. 2010); id. § 15.7.5 (2d ed. Supp. 2018). 
 102. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (using 
“trustworthiness” in the sense of “reliable sources of information” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 602 
advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules)). 
 103. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  For a criticism of Joiner, see KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, ch. 9. 
 104. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 105. Id. at 1994. 
 106. See generally David H. Kaye, Deadly Statistics:  Quantifying an ‘Unacceptable Risk’ 
in Capital Punishment, 16 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 7, 7–8 (2017). 
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C.  Scientific Validity of a Measurement Procedure 
Reliability is not validity.  If the markings on the rigid ruler were too wide 
apart, measurements made with it would consistently understate true length.  
Its use would be reliable but not valid.  The highly elastic ruler would be 
neither reliable nor valid for measuring length.  The Law School Admissions 
Test has been validated as a predictor of first-year law school grades.  It is 
not perfect, but it is considerably better than guessing (or predicting that 
everyone will receive the average grade).  It is less valid as a predictor of 
success in law practice, but the scores are the same (and equally reliable) for 
either use.  The polygraph reliably and validly measures physiological 
variables such as respiration rate.  It is less valid (but no less reliable) for 
measuring conscious deception.  As these examples indicate, scientific 
validity of a measurement procedure involves its accuracy for a specified use. 
The PCAST report redefines scientific validity to fit both parts of the legal 
mold of Rule 702.107  For PCAST (unlike Daubert), there are at least “two 
types of scientific validity”108—“foundational validity” corresponding to the 
legal requirement in Rule 702(c) of “reliable principles and methods”109 and 
“validity as applied mean[ing] that the method has been [correctly] applied 
in practice.”110  Translating these legal-scientific terms back into the standard 
scientific ones, we could say that “foundational validity” refers to the validity 
of a measurement procedure, and “validity as applied” refers to a flawed 
application of the valid measuring system.  For example, if an instrument is 
shown to validly (i.e., accurately) measure breath ethanol concentration when 
properly calibrated, it has “foundational validity” for the purpose of 
measuring breath alcohol.  It can do what it is supposed to do.  If it is not 
correctly calibrated, however, it cannot be trusted to do the job—at least, not 
as accurately as expected.111 
The PCAST report’s requirements for showing “foundational validity” of 
largely subjective feature-comparison methods rest on the assumption that 
examiners will provide categorical conclusions about the true source.  In 
response to such testimony, PCAST promulgated the following categorical, 
quantitative rule for validity: 
Methods with a high FPR (false positive rate) are scientifically unreliable 
for making important judgments in court about the source of a sample.  To 
be considered reliable, the FPR should certainly be less than 5 percent and 
 
 107. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 142. 
 108. Id. at 4.  Another type of scientific validity—“external validity”—also is part of 
Daubert and Rule 702’s “reliability.” See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 12.5.4.  This type of 
validity refers to generalizability or projectability of findings from specific studies (such as 
the “black box” experiments discussed in the PCAST report) to actual casework.  The report 
cautions that experiments must involve “known and representative samples from each relevant 
population.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 152. 
 109. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 4–5. 
 110. Id. at 5. 
 111. It is not obvious what is gained by denominating the proper application of a valid 
system for measuring something as a form of “validity.” 
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it may be appropriate that it be considerably lower, depending on the 
intended application.112 
The meaning of “scientifically unreliable” is slippery at best.  The 
conventional choice of the 0.05 level for a statistical test may or may not be 
appropriate here, but reliability and validity are not binary quantities.  As the 
passage (and the earlier examples) indicate, reliability and validity come in 
degrees.113  Demanding a low rate of false positives will increase the rate of 
false negatives.  At first blush, it might seem that the threshold for validity 
(and hence admissibility) should be very high in a criminal case since the 
legal system regards false convictions as worse than false acquittals.  But the 
law certainly does not require that each piece of evidence prove guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  That standard applies to the totality of the evidence.  If 
the scientific brick in the wall of evidence adds some structural integrity, it 
normally can be inserted.114 
Thus, one can deny that a false-positive probability below 0.05 is essential 
to validity.115  A method that generates probative evidence can still be 
scientifically valid for its intended use.116  The use is to inform the factfinder 
of a possible association to the trace material so that the judge or jury will 
use the information to make a better decision.117  And if that is to happen, the 
fact finder must know about something else emphasized in the 2009 NRC 
report and the newer PCAST report—the uncertainty in the findings.  
Whether dictated by the scientific-validity requirement of Rule 702,118 by 
 
 112. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 151–52. 
 113. Cf. Dale A. Nance, Two Concepts of Reliability, 5 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 1, 4 (2005) 
(making this point about “evidentiary reliability”). 
 114. See United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2013); Nance, supra note 
113, at 4 (“‘Sufficiently reliable to be considered’ is not the same as ‘sufficiently reliable to 
warrant a verdict.’”).  I am barely scratching the surface of these issues.  For more analysis of 
the PCAST 0.05 level for validity and false-positive probabilities in statistical hypothesis 
testing, see generally David H. Kaye, Hypothesis Testing in Law and Forensic Science:  A 
Memorandum, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 127 (2017); David H. Kaye, The Source and Soundness 
of PCAST’s 5% Rule, FORENSIC SCI. STAT. & L. (July 23, 2017, 9:58 PM), http://for-sci-
law.blogspot.com/2017/07/the-source-and-soundness-of-pcasts-5.html 
[https://perma.cc/YU8T-HGQC]. 
 115. KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 15.7.5(c) (2d ed. Supp. 2018).  As noted elsewhere, 
If judgments can be shown to be somewhat informative, and the modest degree to 
which they are discriminating can be explained, does it follow that they are 
inadmissible on grounds of scientific validity—or is this a legal judgment under 
Rule 403?  PCAST seems to regard validity as a purely scientific question under 
Rule 702—scientists inform the courts of scientific validity.  But a case can be made 
for regarding slightly probative results as satisfying Rule 702(c)’s “reliability” 
requirement, and then considering whether the somewhat discriminating evidence 
can be presented and used for what it is worth. 
Id. 
 116. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Ultracrepidarianism in Forensic Science:  The Hair 
Evidence Debacle, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 227, 252–53 (2015). 
 117. See Herrera, 704 F.3d at 486–87. 
 118. The report refers to exaggerated expressions for either probative value or the 
probability of a conclusion from measurements that come from a valid-as-applied and 
foundationally valid method as “not scientifically valid.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS 
ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 145. 
2018] DAUBERT & CRIMINALISTICS 1655 
Rule 403, which warrants exclusion to avoid unfairly prejudicial evidence,119 
or by scientific and prosecutorial ethical norms, purportedly scientific 
evidence should be conveyed in a manner that reduces the risk of its being 
grossly overvalued.  The next Part therefore sketches two different ways to 
express uncertainty in forensic-science findings. 
IV.  EXPRESSING UNCERTAINTY 
Empirical science—indeed, all ampliative reasoning—can achieve only 
degrees of certainty, and “probability is the logic of uncertainty.”120  Broadly 
speaking, two approaches to presenting the results of comparisons of traces 
to known samples are in use.121  Traditionally (and overwhelmingly in the 
United States), criminalists speak to the probability of possible conclusions 
about the source of the trace.  An alternative approach that dominates the 
academic literature on forensic inference122 requires criminalists to openly 
and transparently address the probability of the measured or observed 
similarities under different theories of the origin of the samples.123  No 
revision to Rule 702 should foreclose the second method of interpreting the 
data. 
A.  Conclusions About Hypotheses 
The traditional mode of testimony supplies opinions as to the probability 
that a hypothesis about the source of a trace is true.  For example, the 
Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners (AFTE) encourages 
“opinions of common origin to be made when the unique surface contours of 
two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement.’”124  “Sufficient agreement” is a 
“subjective” judgment “based on the examiner’s training and experience” 
that the toolmarks are more similar than ones the examiner remembers as 
having “been produced by different tools.”125  It “means that . . . the 
likelihood another tool could have made the mark is so remote as to be 
considered a practical impossibility.”126  If this explanation of a reported 
association between a cartridge case and a known gun is presented in court, 
the examiner is stating (1) that the patterns being compared are remarkably 
similar and (2) that the probability that any other tool made the mark is close 
 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 120. JOSEPH K. BLITZSTEIN & JESSICA HWANG, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY 1 (2015). 
 121. See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, chs. 13–15.  See generally BERNARD ROBERTSON 
ET AL., INTERPRETING EVIDENCE:  EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (2d ed. 
2016). 
 122. INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 1, at 170; Geoffrey S. Morrison et al., A Comment on the 
PCAST Report:  Skip the “Match”/”Non-Match” Stage, 272 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, at e7, e7–
e8 (2017). 
 123. See, e.g., I.W. Evett et al., Finding the Way Forward for Forensic Science in the U.S.—
A Commentary on the PCAST Report, 278 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 16, 23 (2017). 
 124. AFTE Theory of Identification as It Relates to Toolmarks, ASS’N FIREARM & TOOL 
MARK EXAMINERS, https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification 
[https://perma.cc/UVP3-N555] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  This is said to occur when the examiner does not recall encountering the same 
degree of similarity in marks known to have come from the same source. Id. 
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to 0.  Statement (1) is an opinion about the features, while (2) is a statement 
about the probability of the hypothesis that a particular gun is the source of 
the mark.  That probability, in the examiner’s mind, is practically 1.  Most 
courts would allow the examiner to testify to the categorical conclusion that 
bullets came from the same gun.127 
PCAST maintains that although one well-designed experiment shows a 
sufficiently small rate of errors for subjective same-source classifications for 
bullets from one make of gun, that experiment (together with studies of other, 
less rigorous designs) is not enough to meet the criteria for scientific validity.  
Perhaps recognizing that not all courts will follow those demanding criteria, 
however, the report urges courts allowing source attributions to require that 
they be accompanied by statements of the upper limit of the one-sided 95 
percent confidence interval on the false-positive error rate from the study.128  
The details of the proposal to use the false-positive error rate from controlled 
experiments to estimate errors are debatable.  Moreover, there are better 
statistical measures of probative value.  Even so, if the current practice of 
making source attributions is to continue, supplying jurors with some 
objectively determined estimate of the accuracy achieved by examiners as 
tested in cases like the one at bar is vital.129 
B.  Evaluations of Support for Competing Hypotheses 
Opining on the truth or falsity of a source hypothesis is not the only way 
to present subjective findings from feature comparisons.  Instead of somehow 
judging the probability of a source attribution given the similarity in the 
features, the criminalist can describe the degree to which the comparison 
supports the source attribution as opposed to the extent to which it supports 
an inference to some other source.130  He or she can do this by estimating the 
probability of observing the measured similarities when the source 
hypothesis is true and when it is false.  If the probabilities are the same, the 
evidence has no probative value.  If the perceived degree of similarity occurs 
as often when one item is the source as when another item is, then the 
similarities do not help us choose between these possibilities.  But if the 
degree of similarity is more common when examining traces from the same 
 
 127. E.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089–90 (2014).  A small number of federal 
district courts have limited the degree of certainty that the examiner can express in the truth of 
the hypothesis. KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 15.2.4.  See generally David H. Kaye, Firearm-
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2018). 
 128. The report’s treatment of confidence intervals is problematic in relatively small ways. 
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2018] DAUBERT & CRIMINALISTICS 1657 
source than when encountering traces from different sources, then the 
similarity is probative evidence.131 
Thus, what determines relative support is the ratio of the probability of the 
similarity given that the trace came from the same source to the probability 
given that it came from a different source.  To be more concrete, suppose that 
the observed level of similarity in the bullet cartridges that might have come 
from the defendant’s gun occurs ten times more often for same-gun bullets 
than for different-gun bullets.  Then even if the false-positive error 
probability exceeds 0.05, the observed similarity is somewhat probative of 
the cartridge recovered from the scene of the shooting having been in the 
defendant’s gun.132 
The ratio I have described is known as a likelihood ratio.  It is a more 
complete measure of probative value than is a false-positive probability.  But 
there are questions about whether a lay fact finder will correctly use either a 
categorical conclusion accompanied by a false-positive probability or a 
likelihood ratio to give the evidence the weight it deserves.133  For example, 
counterintuitively—and contrary to what some courts have written—a false-
positive probability is not the probability that the positive report on the source 
is false.134  Similarly, the likelihood ratio cannot generally be equated to the 
odds in favor of the source hypothesis.135  Nonetheless, the state of research 
into misuse of expressions of uncertainty is still primitive, and there may be 
presentations that would reduce the risk of misunderstanding.  At this point, 
it would be premature to assume that it is better to exclude moderately 
probative criminalistics evidence because it might be misunderstood. 
Of course, the fact that the likelihood ratio is a more conceptually complete 
measure of the probative value of evidence does not remove the need to show 
that criminalists relying on heavily subjective impressions136 will provide 
accurate statements of the magnitude of evidentiary support.137  If the 
 
 131. E.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.2; David H. Kaye, Digging into the Foundations 
of Evidence Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 915, 923–25 (2017). 
 132. A Bayesian statistician would say that it changes the odds in favor of the defendant’s 
gun from whatever they were before considering the evidence to ten times those odds. See, 
e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.3.1; Kaye, supra note 131, at 925–27. 
 133. In addition, the witness who presents it is not forced into making a somewhat arbitrary 
match/no-match declaration. Morrison et al., supra note 122, at e7–e8.  For an example of 
such testimony, see David H. Kaye, Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and a Pair of Shoes, 53 
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 1–3 (2012). 
 134. David H. Kaye, The False-Positive Fallacy in the First Opinion to Discuss the PCAST 
Report, FORENSIC SCI. STAT. & L. (Nov. 3, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/ 
2016/11/the-false-positive-fallacy-in-first.html [https://perma.cc/U2C4-NVT9]. 
 135. KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.2.2; id. § 14.5.2(a) (2d ed. Supp. 2016). 
 136. The impressions will be grounded in training and experience, but the concern remains 
that they are not informed by objective, applicable, and quantified data on the variability of 
the features in samples from a common source as opposed to those from two different sources.  
In time, for some evidence types, we can expect criminalists testifying in the likelihood-ratio 
format (whether qualitative or quantitative) to be assisted by computer programs and databases 
and to move beyond “the expression of personal, egocentric and generally badly articulated 
opinions.” Christophe Champod, Fingerprint Identification:  Advances Since the 2009 
National Research Council Report, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS B, Aug. 5, 2015, at 1, 7. 
 137. Cf. David V. Budescu & Timothy R. Johnson, A Model-Based Approach for the 
Analysis of the Calibration of Probability Judgments, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 857, 
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probabilities that determine the likelihood ratio are impressionistic rather 
than data driven, will examiners actually report that the similarities are the 
kind that arise more often for same-source traces when they are in fact from 
the same source—but not when they are from different sources?  Just using 
likelihood ratios to express probative value does not eliminate the concern 
about unvalidated, subjective judgments.  As with testing examiners who 
make subjective source attributions and exclusions, performance studies of 
examiners who present highly subjective ratios are critically important.138 
CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has not performed well in regulating the 
admission of putatively scientific identification methods for associating 
traces with their possible sources.  The original rule was just a shell that 
referred to expert knowledge of various types.  The Supreme Court stepped 
in repeatedly to infuse the rule with more content, but for several fields of 
criminalistics the lower courts dodged the bullet that Daubert might have 
been. 
Forensic science has grown stronger over the years, partly in response to 
criticism from scientists and lawyers alike.139  But much remains to be done, 
and prominent reports from the National Academies and the President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology have focused attention on 
the largely subjective source conclusions of criminalists.  Most of these 
efforts to identify traces are not “junk science”—they can produce at least 
modestly helpful evidence.140  But all have been oversold in the courtroom, 
and the current mode of source attribution, as opposed to expressions of 
evidentiary support, is not optimal. 
Modifications to or authoritative advice on Rule 702 could be useful to 
encourage courts to look more critically at claims like the following:  “it 
could be falsified,” “there are many publications,” “a second examiner is a 
form of peer review,” “there are many standards,” and “acceptance in a 
‘Daubert community’ is good enough.”  A revised rule could explicitly insist 
on more rigorous validation of evidence that is promoted as “scientific” and 
try to ensure that evidence deemed admissible as other “specialized 
knowledge” is descientized.  It could sharpen the definitions of terms like 
“valid” and “reliable.”  It could remain flexible enough to allow the 
admission of scientific or experiential evidence that has probative value when 
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that value is reasonably estimated and presented to the fact finder.  It could 
replace source attributions with expert evaluations of whether and how much 
support the observations provide for those attributions.  No doubt, courts 
could apply Rule 702 (and Rule 403) as currently phrased to do all these 
things.  But they have not done so, and judicial inertia is hard to overcome. 
 
